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 Proportionality in Interpreting Constitutions: 
A Comparison between Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Singapore and its Implications 
for Vietnam 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee1
Few rights that are guaranteed by constitutions and bills of rights are expressed to be 
absolute. In many jurisdictions, the legislature is permitted to impose restrictions on 
rights for specified reasons and under particular conditions. However, constitutional 
or bill of rights text often do not expressly indicate how the courts should determine 
that applicants’ rights have been legitimately restricted. To this end, courts in 
jurisdictions such as Canada and the United Kingdom have adopted the European 
doctrine of proportionality. Essentially, this requires them to balance opposing types 
of public interests – the interest sought to be protected by the rights in question, and 
other public interests such as national security, the protection of people’s reputation, 
public order, and so on. A proportionality analysis also requires courts to consider 
whether limitations on rights imposed by executive or legislative action have a 
rational relationship with the object of the action, and, if so, whether the limitations 
restrict rights as little as possible. 
On the other hand, when interpreting the fundamental liberties in the Singapore 
Constitution, courts presently do not engage in a proportionality analysis. This paper 
considers how the rejection of proportionality has affected the rights to freedom of 
speech and assembly, and argues that the application of proportionality in Singapore 
is not only desirable but necessary if the Constitution is to be regarded as 
guaranteeing fundamental liberties instead of merely setting out privileges that may 
be abridged at will by the Government. It is hoped there are lessons in Singapore’s 
experience that Vietnam can learn from. 
FEW RIGHTS that are guaranteed by constitutions and bills of rights are expressed to 
be absolute. In many common law jurisdictions, the legislature is permitted to 
impose restrictions on rights for specified reasons and under particular conditions. 
However, constitutional or bill of rights text often do not expressly indicate how the 
courts should determine that applicants’ rights have been legitimately restricted. To 
this end, courts in jurisdictions such as Canada and the United Kingdom have 
adopted the European doctrine of proportionality, which essentially requires them to 
balance opposing types of public interests – the interest sought to be protected by the 
rights in question, and other public interests such as national security, the protection 
of people’s reputation, public order, and so on. 
                                                   
1  LLB (Hons) (Nat’l University of Singapore), LLM (UCL, Lond); PhD (B’ham); Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore), Solicitor 
(England & Wales); Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
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The Singapore courts currently do not take a proportionality approach in 
constitutional adjudication. This paper argues that adopting proportionality would 
be consonant with the text of the Constitution, and would allow the courts to perform 
their role of checking executive and legislative power more effectively. We then 
consider what lessons the experiences of Canada, the United Kingdom and Singapore 
have for Vietnam, the 1992 Constitution of which is drafted in a manner not very 
different from the Singapore Constitution. 
Our discussion of proportionality presupposes that a system of constitutional 
review exists in the jurisdiction. Part I of the paper explains how rights are enforced 
through constitutional review in common law jurisdictions that have written 
constitutions, and looks at how the Vietnamese Constitution might be reformed in 
this regard. Part II describes what a proportionality analysis involves and examines 
how it operates in Canada and the United Kingdom. It then goes on to discuss the 
current position in Singapore, and compares it to the Vietnamese situation. 
Thereafter, it is argued that despite the way in which the Singapore Constitution is 
drafted – without terms such as “reasonable restrictions” or “restrictions necessary 
in a democratic society” that might require the courts to apply a proportionality 
analysis – the adoption of proportionality is consistent with the text and some of the 
Singapore courts’ jurisprudence, and would avoid problems associated with the 
current interpretive methodology. Part III contains concluding thoughts. It suggests 
that a proportionality analysis should be applied when interpreting the bill of rights 
in the Singapore Constitution, and that the Vietnamese Constitution should also be 
amended to allow for the use of proportionality in constitutional review. 
I. ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A proportionality analysis is a technique applied by courts in some jurisdictions such 
as Canada and the United Kingdom to determine whether it is appropriate for the 
executive branch of government to take actions or make decisions, or for the 
legislature to enact laws, that limit constitutional rights. Judges in those legal 
systems have the responsibility to ensure that executive and legislative acts are in 
line with the constitution. 
Therefore, before we examine how a proportionality analysis assists in 
constitutional interpretation, it is necessary to say something about the enforcement 
of constitutional rights. In common law jurisdictions that have a written constitution 
such as Canada, India, Malaysia, Singapore and the United States of America, the 
constitution is regarded as a law that is more basic and fundamental than ordinary 
laws enacted by the legislature or issued by the executive branch of government. If an 
ordinary law is inconsistent with one or more provisions of the constitution, the 
constitution takes precedence over the ordinary law. The latter is therefore void and 
has no effect. Sometimes this is made clear by a provision in the constitution itself. 
For example, Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore2 states: 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law 
enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is 
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
 
2  1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint. The Constitution can be viewed on the Internet at Singapore Statutes 
Online <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg>. 
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Constitutions frequently contain bills of rights, that is, lists of human rights that are 
guaranteed to people within the jurisdiction. Such rights are thus superior to 
ordinary laws. 
The branch of government considered to have power to decide whether or not 
an ordinary law is unconstitutional is the judiciary. This concept was established in 
the 19th century in a United States case, Marbury v Madison.3 The Supreme Court 
of the United States held that since it is the court’s duty to decide legal disputes that 
are brought before it, and since the Constitution is a form of law, it must be the 
responsibility of the court to determine whether there is a conflict between the 
Constitution and an ordinary law. In the case Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public 
Prosecutor,4 the Singapore High Court made a similar assertion: 
The court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are 
observed. The court also has a duty to declare invalid any exercise of power, legislative 
and executive, which exceeds the limits of the power conferred by the Constitution, or 
which contravenes any prohibition which the Constitution provides.5
Significantly, the Court recognized that its role is to ensure that both laws and 
actions by executive bodies comply with the requirements of the Constitution. 
The situation in Vietnam is different, even though Article 146 of the 1992 
Constitution of Vietnam6 is a supremacy clause much like the one in the Singapore 
Constitution: 
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the fundamental law of the 
State and has supreme legal force. 
All other legal documents must be consistent with the Constitution. 
Article 84 goes on to provide that the National Assembly of Vietnam has the duty and 
power to “exercise the right to supreme supervision over the observance of the 
Constitution” 7  and to “abrogate texts adopted by the President, the Standing 
Committee of the National Assembly, the Government, the Prime Minister of the 
Government, the Supreme People’s Court and the People’s Inspectorate General 
which are incompatible with the Constitution, the laws and resolutions of the 
National Assembly”. 8  More specifically, under Article 91(5) it is the duty of the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly: 
… to suspend the implementation of texts adopted by the Government, the Prime 
Minister, the Supreme People’s Court, the People’s Inspectorate General which are 
incompatible with the Constitution, laws and resolutions of the National Assembly 
 
3  5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
4  [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, HC (Singapore). 
5  Id at 231, [50], citing a paper by Harry Gibbs, “The Court as Guardian of the Constitution: The 
Basic Principle” in Mohamed Salleh Abas & Visu Sinnadurai (eds), Law, Justice and the Judiciary: 
Transnational Trends (Kuala Lumpur: Professional Law Book Publishers, 1988) at 51–66. 
6  1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as amended by Resolution 51-2001-QH10 
of Legislature X of the National Assembly at its 10th Session, 25 December 2001. In this paper, I 
refer to the English translation of the Constitution prepared by Allens Arthur Robinson, which is 
available at <http://www.vietnamlaws.com/freelaws/Constitution92%28aa01%29.pdf/> 
(accessed 13 July 2012; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/20110717202221/http://www. 
vietnamlaws.com/freelaws/Constitution92%28aa01%29.pdf/>. 
7  Vietnam Constitution, Art 84(2). 
8  Id, Art 84(9). 
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and submit to decision of the National Assembly recommendations on the abrogation 
of those texts … . 
One distinction between the Vietnamese legal system and those of common 
law jurisdictions having written constitutions is that in Vietnam the legislature rather 
than the judiciary is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, as of 2009 it appears that neither the National Assembly nor the 
Standing Committee have declared any legal texts to be unconstitutional.9 Legal 
scholar Nguyen Van Thao has suggested two reasons for this: first, the Constitution 
does not make it clear which government institution is responsible for assessing the 
constitutionality of laws; and secondly, the Constitution does not clearly explain the 
National Assembly’s powers to abrogate or cancel laws on the basis of 
unconstitutionality.10
There have been calls since the 1990s11 for some mechanism to be established 
to enable laws and executive actions and decisions that are incompatible with the 
Constitution to be annulled. For instance, in October 2001 Nguyen Van Thao 
published an article in the Tap chi Cong san (Communist Review), the Communist 
Party of Vietnam’s leading theoretical journal, calling for a constitutional court (toa 
an hien phap) or constitutional commission (uy ban hien phap)12 to be set up so that 
unconstitutional legal documents can be dealt with. He also submitted that 
administrative courts can be empowered to determine if activities of governmental 
bodies comply with the Constitution and other laws.13 The need for a means of 
constitutional review was also raised by some delegates during National Assembly 
discussions on amendments to the Constitution in November 2001,14 and in March 
2005 a conference held under the auspices of the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly and the Communist Party’s Internal Affairs Commission 
highlighted that “constitutional protection” was difficult because the Constitution did 
not create a specialized body such as a constitutional court or commission but left the 
task to various state bodies.15
Thus, it is likely that when the Constitution is reviewed again, this issue will 
need to be addressed. Mark Sidel has suggested that since protection of the 
Constitution formally lies with the National Assembly, the Government can delegate 
to the Ministry of Justice the task of dealing with unconstitutional or otherwise 
 
9  Mark Sidel, “Enforcing the Constitution: The Debate over ‘Constitutional Protection’ and a 
Constitutional Court” in The Constitution of Vietnam: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford; Portland, 
Or: Hart Publishing, 2009), 183–210 at 186. The point is also made by a Vietnamese legal scholar, 
Nguyen Van Thao: see “Vi kiem tra tinh hop hien, hop phap cua van ban phap luat vac ac co quan 
tu phap [On the Inspection of the Constitutionality and Legality of Legal Documents and Judicial 
Agencies]”, Bao Khoa hoc va Phat trien (Science and Development News) (3 October 2001), 
reprinted at <http://www.na.gov.vn>, cited by Sidel, id at 190. 
10  Thao, ibid. 
11  In 1997, the National Assembly was petitioned to establish a constitutional court “to have an 
institution with jurisdiction to review petitions and to adjudicate (xet xu) cases of Constitutional 
violations”: cited in Sidel, Constitution of Vietnam, above, n 9 at 188. 
12  The Vietnamese terms are mentioned in Mark Sidel, “Constitutionalism and the Emergence of 
Constitutional Dialogue in Vietnam” in Law and Society in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 18–49 at 39. 
13  Nguyen Van Thao, “Soan thao, sua doi hien phap va thuc hien bao ve Hien phap [Revising and 
Amending the Constitution and Mechanisms for Constitutional Protection]”, Tai chi Cong san 
(Communist Review) (October 2001) <http://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn> (accessed 26 
February 2009), cited by Sidel, Constitution of Vietnam, above, n 9 at 189–190. 
14  Sidel, Constitution of Vietnam, id at 190–191. 
15  Id at 201. 
Lee: Proportionality in Interpreting Constitutions … 5 
 
                                                  
illegal laws made by provincial and municipal authorities.16 As for legislation issued 
by the National Assembly itself, it may be feasible for a special committee of the 
Assembly to be set up to examine whether draft laws are consistent with the 
Constitution before they are enacted by the Assembly. Committees of this nature 
exist in a number of common law jurisdictions. For example, in the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom this task is fulfilled by two committees. The Parliament has two 
chambers – the upper chamber is called the House of Lords, and the lower chamber 
the House of Commons. The Constitution Committee of the House of Lords 
considers the constitutional implications of bills (draft laws) and, if it thinks fit, 
prepares reports to notify members of House of Lords on its views.17 There is also a 
Joint Committee on Human Rights – ‘joint’ because it consists of members from 
both Houses of Parliament – that examines government bills for their compatibility 
with human rights law.18
Although such legislative committees play an important role in ensuring that 
laws that are enacted comply with constitutional and human rights principles, it is 
submitted that they are an insufficient check because they are not independent of the 
legislature. The doctrine of the rule of law requires that the validity of laws be 
assessed by a body unconnected with the law-creating institution.19 For this reason, 
in common law jurisdictions the main responsibility of ensuring the constitutionality 
of laws lies with the courts, which are regarded as independent from the executive 
government and the legislature. It may be noted that in many of these jurisdictions, 
including Canada, Singapore and the United Kingdom, the task is carried out by 
ordinary courts rather than specialized constitutional courts. 
II. PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION; CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Let us assume, then, that a constitutional review mechanism is adopted in Vietnam, 
whether such review is carried out by the National Assembly or some other 
institution such as a constitutional court or commission. One key question that arises 
is how the reviewing body should go about determining whether it is appropriate for 
the legislature or other lawmaking bodies to issue laws that restrict rights guaranteed 
by the constitution. 
This question is relevant because bills of rights generally do not express in 
absolute terms the fundamental rights in them. In other words, most rights are 
subject to legitimate limitations on specified grounds. For example, Article 10(1) of 
 
16  Id at 208. 
17  “Lords Select Committee: Constitutional Committee – Role” <http://www.parliament.uk/ 
business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/constitution-committee/role/> (accessed 18 
July 2012; archived at <http://web.archive.org/web/20110605114257/http://www.parliament. 
uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/constitution-committee/role/>). 
18  “Joint Select Committee: Human Rights” <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/ 
committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/> (accessed 18 July 2012; archived at 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110605012549/http://www.parliament.uk/business/committe
es/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/>), and “Joint Select Committee: 
[Human Rights:] Legislative Scrutiny 2012–13” <http://www.parliament.uk/business/ 
committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/legislative-scrutiny-2012-
13/> (accessed 18 July 2012; archived at <http://www.webcitation.org/69EWjGVeL>). As the 
UK does not have a written constitution, human rights are protected by a law called the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (available on the Internet at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1998/42/contents>, accessed 19 July 2012). 
19  See, for example, Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195 at 200–201. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights,20 which applies to all Council of Europe 
member states including the United Kingdom, guarantees the right to freedom of 
expression, while Article 10(2) provides, in the following terms, that restrictions on 
the right may be imposed: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Similarly, fundamental liberties are guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,21 but section 1 of the Charter states that they are subject “only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society”. In the presence of such limitation clauses, when a litigant 
presents a plausible argument that an activity lies within a liberty guaranteed to him 
or her by the constitution, it is incumbent on the court to consider if the government 
has presented sufficient public interest reasons showing that limitations are 
reasonable and proportional. 
Commentators have noted that the application of proportionality analysis in 
rights adjudication is now widespread, particularly in jurisdictions on the ‘new 
constitutionalism’ model. The characteristics of this model of government include (1) 
a written constitution establishing and empowering institutions of government; (2) 
ultimate power placed in the hands of the people through regular elections or 
referenda; (3) the subjection of public authority to the constitution; (4) the existence 
of a bill of rights and a judicial review system ensuring that rights are upheld; and (5) 
procedures specified in the constitution for its revision.22 Thus, in R v Oakes,23 the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that a proportionality analysis was to be applied when 
determining if a law limiting a right guaranteed by the Canadian Charter could be 
upheld under section 1 of the Charter as “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society”. So, too, has the European Court of Human Rights 
employed a proportionality approach to the necessity clauses qualifying European 
Convention rights. This is evident in such cases as Dudgeon v United Kingdom24 
which held that interference with a right cannot be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society unless it is proportionate to a legitimate aim pursued by the legal 
restriction in question.25 When the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)26 came into force 
in 2000, providing aggrieved persons with remedies in domestic law for breaches of 
 
20  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), ETS 5, 213 UNTS 221, given legal effect in 
the United Kingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998, above, n 18, ss 1(1)–(3) read with Sch 1. 
21  Pt I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), which was itself enacted as Sch B to the Canada Act 
1982 (c 11) (UK). See <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/charter/> (accessed 19 July 2012). 
22  Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” 
(2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72 at 84–85. 
23  [1986] 1 SCR 103, SC (Canada). The proportionality analysis has been refined in subsequent cases 
such as Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927, SC (Canada); and RJR-
MacDonald Inc v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, SC (Canada). 
24  (1981) 4 EHRR 149, ECHR. 
25  Id at 165, [53], applying Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at 754, [49], ECHR, 
and Young, James & Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 38 at 56, [63], ECHR. 
26  Above, n 18. 
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Convention rights, the House of Lords confirmed that a proportionality analysis 
would be applied to necessity clauses.27
In general, adopting a proportionality approach can be said to be a four-stage 
process:28
 
i. First, there is a consideration of whether the government is legally 
authorized to enact the restrictive measure in question. 
ii. Secondly, an assessment is carried out as to whether there is a rational 
relation between the means adopted in the measure and the stated 
policy objectives of the measure. This is often known as the test of 
suitability. 
iii. Thirdly, the measure must be found to infringe rights as minimally as 
possible. This is known as the test of necessity. 
iv. Finally, there is an examination of whether the benefits of the measure 
outweigh the costs arising from a curtailment of rights. This is often 
termed ‘proportionality in the narrow sense’. 
 
As might be imagined, the manner in which proportionality is applied differs slightly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.29 While a detailed comparison is beyond the scope 
of this paper, in general most proportionality analyses have the elements of the four-
stage process set out above. I submit that the method of analysis has several 
advantages. First, stage 1 ensures that the lawmaking body has legal authorization for 
passing the restrictive measure, thus fulfilling what the rule of law requires. Secondly, 
the analysis provides a structured framework for deciding whether a measure 
appropriately limits constitutional rights. In particular, stage 2 ensures that the 
restriction is put in place for the purpose of fulfilling an important government policy 
and not for trivial reasons; while stage 3 mandates that the measure to restrict rights 
as little as possible, thus securing that people are still able to enjoy their rights to the 
greatest allowable extent. Thirdly, stage 4 requires a consideration of whether the 
restrictive measure is excessive. A familiar expression used in this context is that one 
should not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut – it would be inappropriate, for 
example, to impose the death penalty on someone who committed a minor criminal 
offence. 
B. SINGAPORE AND VIETNAM 
1. Singapore 
The situation in Singapore contrasts with the situation in Canada and the United 
Kingdom, because the bill of rights in the Singapore Constitution does not expressly 
require courts to balance the costs of limiting fundamental liberties against 
legislative goals. As a result, the High Court of Singapore has decided in some cases 
 
27  R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 at 547, [27], HL, citing 
de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 
[1999] 1 AC 69 at 80, PC (on appeal from Antigua and Barbuda). 
28  Stone Sweet & Mathews, above, n 22 at 75–76. 
29  For instance, it has been pointed out that the ECHR does not regard the first stage as part of the 
proportionality analysis: id at 75, n 8. The test applied by the House of Lords in Daly, above, n 27, 
omitted the first and fourth stages, and included before stage 2 a consideration of whether the 
legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right. Arguably, this 
consideration can be regarded as part of stage 2 of the four-stage process set out in the main text. 
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that a proportionality analysis should not be applied to the Constitution. This, it is 
submitted, leads to certain problems. 
Part IV of the Singapore Constitution contains its bill of rights. Like the 
Canadian Charter and the European Convention, various provisions guarantee 
fundamental liberties to all persons (or, in some cases, to Singapore citizens),30 but 
permit legislative restrictions to be imposed for specific purposes. Articles 14(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution, for instance, read as follows: 
14.— (1) Subject to clauses (2) and (3) — 
(a) every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) all citizens of Singapore have the right to assemble peaceably and without 
arms; and 
(c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to form associations. 
(2) Parliament may by law impose — 
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and 
restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide 
against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence; 
(b) on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof or public order; and 
(c) on the right conferred by clause (1)(c), such restrictions as it considers 
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part 
thereof, public order or morality. 
One significant difference between this clause and analogous provisions in the 
European Convention and the Canadian Charter is that it does not contain any words 
significantly qualifying the ability of the Singapore Parliament to restrict the 
fundamental liberties in question. Thus, on a plain reading, Article 14(2) appears to 
permit Parliament to enact restrictive laws that curtail rights to free speech, assembly 
and association, without any requirement that the laws are reasonable and necessary 
in a democratic society. The Article does introduce tests of necessity and expediency, 
but, as we will see shortly, 31  they do not operate as appreciable constraints on 
Parliament’s lawmaking powers. Furthermore, the tests do not apply to some of the 
grounds listed in Article 14(2)(a), thus apparently authorizing Parliament to impose 
outright on the freedom of speech and expression “restrictions designed to protect 
the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or 
incitement to any offence”. 
In view of how this constitutional provision is drafted, the High Court has, to 
date, largely rejected the application of a proportionality analysis. In Chee Siok Chin 
v Minister for Home Affairs,32 the applicants had been staging a protest outside a 
 
30  See the Singapore Constitution, Art 12(2) (prohibition of certain forms of discrimination), Art 13 
(prohibition of banishment, and freedom of movement), Art 14 (rights to freedom of speech and 
expression, assembly and association), and Art 16 (rights in respect of education). 
31  See the text accompanying n 38, below. 
32  [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582, HC (Singapore). A proportionality analysis has also been rejected in a more 
recent case, Chee Soon Juan v Public Prosecutor [2011] 2 SLR 940, HC (Singapore). 
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government building when they were asked by a police officer to disperse on the 
basis that they were causing a public nuisance contrary to the Miscellaneous Offences 
(Public Order and Nuisance) Act (‘MOA’).33 The applicants commenced proceedings 
in the High Court against the Minister for Home Affairs and the Commissioner of 
Police, asserting that, by so acting, the police officer had behaved unlawfully and/or 
unconstitutionally, in violation of their rights to free expression and assembly 
guaranteed by Articles 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. Upon the respondents’ 
application for the proceedings to be struck out on the ground that they were, among 
other things, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process,34 the 
High Court considered whether the provisions of the MOA relied upon by the 
respondents to justify the police officer’s actions were constitutional.35
The Court contrasted Article 14(2), which authorizes Parliament to impose 
restrictions on the rights protected by Article 14(1), with Article 19(3) of the Indian 
Constitution. The latter permits the state to impose “reasonable restrictions” on the 
right to assemble in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public 
order. 36  In view of the absence of an equivalent phrase from the Singapore 
Constitution, the Court said that “there can be no questioning of whether the 
legislation is ‘reasonable’. The court’s sole task, when a constitutional challenge is 
advanced, is to ascertain whether an impugned law is within the purview of any of 
the permissible restrictions. … All that needs to be established is a nexus between the 
object of the impugned law and one of the permissible subjects stipulated in Art 14(2) 
of the Constitution.” 37  Further, the Court noted that the phrase necessary or 
expedient appearing in Article 14(2) (“Parliament may by law impose... such 
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of... public order…”) 
conferred on Parliament “an extremely wide discretionary power and remit that 
permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards achieving any of the 
purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution. … The presumption of legislative 
constitutionality will not be lightly displaced”.38 Since it was clear from the long title 
and “contents and purport” of the MOA, and relevant parliamentary debates, that the 
Act was enacted to preserve public order, its constitutionality was unchallengeable.39
The Court also stated it was “axiomatic that the terms and tenor” of Article 
10(2) of the European Convention are “very different” from Article 14(2) of the 
Singapore Constitution.40 Another “fundamental difference” between English law 
and Singapore law was the applicability of the notion of proportionality, which “inter 
alia, allows a court to examine whether legislative interference with individual rights 
corresponds with a pressing social need; whether it is proportionate to its legitimate 
aim and whether the reasons to justify the statutory interference are relevant and 
sufficient”. The Court then commented: “Needless to say, the notion of 
proportionality has never been part of the common law in relation to the judicial 
 
33  Cap 184, 1997 Rev Ed: id at 592, [13]. During the legal proceedings the Attorney-General, acting 
on the respondents’ behalf, identified the relevant provisions of the Act as s 13A or s 13B, which 
criminalize the causing of harassment, alarm or distress to any person: at 605, [59]. 
34  Id at 589, [1]. 
35  Id at 599–600, [41]. 
36  Id at 601, [45]. 
37  Id at 602–603, [49]. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Id at 604, [55]–[56]. 
40  Id at 615, [86]. 
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review of the exercise of a legislative and/or an administrative power or discretion. 
Nor has it ever been part of Singapore law.”41
The result of the Singapore courts not adopting a proportionality analysis is 
that they accept legislation as constitutional so long as it relates to subjects the bill of 
rights specifies as grounds for restricting fundamental liberties, regardless of how 
disproportionate such laws may be. 
2. Vietnam 
Chapter V (Articles 49–82) of the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam contains a statement 
of the basic rights and obligations of its citizens. Like the Singapore Constitution – 
and unlike the Canadian Charter and European Charter – it is drafted in a manner 
that does not seem to require lawmakers to comply with any test of reasonableness or 
necessity in a democratic society before passing laws that restrict basic rights. For 
example, Article 69 of the Vietnamese Constitution states: “Citizens are entitled to 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press; they have the right to receive 
information and the right of assembly, association and demonstration in accordance 
with the law.”42 The phrase in accordance with the law suggests that so long as some 
law that limits any of the rights mentioned in Article 69 has been validly issued, 
citizens must obey that law and cannot argue that it is arbitrary or a disproportionate 
constraint on their rights. If this interpretation is correct, the possibility exists for 
basic rights to be restricted fairly easily. 
3. Shortcomings of the Singapore Approach, and Implications for 
Vietnam 
If bills of rights are phrased along the lines of the Singapore Constitution, does this 
effectively rule out the application of a proportionality analysis? It is submitted there 
are a number of reasons why what we may call the Chee Siok Chin43 approach should 
not be followed.  
First, full effect ought to be given to the use of the word right in constitutions. 
In a 1998 decision of the Singapore High Court, constitutional rights were 
distinguished from privileges in the following manner: 
Constitutional rights are enjoyed because they are constitutional in nature. They are 
enjoyed as fundamental liberties – not stick-and-carrot privileges. To the extent that 
the Constitution is supreme, those rights are inalienable. Other privileges such as 
subsidies… are enjoyed because the Legislature chooses to confer them – these are 
expressions of policy and political will.44
It is submitted that the word freedom should be understood in the same way. If 
‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ can be overridden simply by the legislature enacting a 
restrictive measure, which is essentially what Chee Siok Chin suggested, then in 
 
41  Id at 616, [87]. 
42  Other provisions of the Vietnamese Constitution are drafted similarly, such as Art 57 (“Citizens 
have the right to freely do business in accordance with the law.”), Art 68 (“Citizens are entitled to 
freedom of movement and residence inside the country, of departure for and return from foreign 
countries in accordance with the law.”), and Art 70 (“Citizens have the right to freedom of belief 
and religion, and may practise or not practise any religion. … No one has the right to infringe on 
the freedom of faith and religion or to take advantage of the latter to violate State laws and 
policies.”) (emphasis added). 
43  Above, n 32. 
44  Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at 102, [56], HC (Singapore). 
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reality they are more similar to privileges which can be taken away at any time. Thus, 
if something is to be properly characterized as a freedom or right, with the 
fundamentality and inalienability that entails, the court must surely be capable of 
assessing whether it has been legitimately abridged. This is where the proportionality 
test comes to the fore. 
When the body bearing responsibility for constitutional review has no role in 
evaluating the fairness of laws, this fails to give proper weight to the concept of a 
right in the constitution. If a right is fundamental and inalienable, it should only be 
limitable in narrowly defined situations which may be discerned through a 
proportionality analysis. 
Secondly, the Chee Siok Chin approach can lead to the enactment of arbitrary 
laws. In a number of Singapore cases judges have asserted it is their duty to gauge 
whether the executive and legislative branches of government have acted arbitrarily. 
Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs45 involved a challenge to detentions 
without trial under the Internal Security Act (‘ISA’).46 The Court of Appeal accepted 
the appellants’ argument that Article 12(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees to 
every person equality before the law and equal protection of the law, requires 
Parliament’s legislative powers not to be “exercised in a manner which authorises or 
requires the exercise of arbitrary power, or the exercise of power in breach of 
fundamental rules of natural justice”.47 Further, since Article 93 vests judicial power 
in the courts, it is for them to determine whether Parliament has exercised its 
discretion properly.48 As the Court put it: “[T]he notion of a subjective or unfettered 
discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law 
demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary 
power.”49
Chan Sek Keong J, one of the three judges contributing to the Chng Suan Tze 
decision, was appointed Chief Justice of Singapore in 2006. Delivering the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal in the 2010 case Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor,50 he 
expressed the view that legislation “of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could 
not possibly have been contemplated by our constitutional framers as being ‘law’ 
when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental liberties” 
would be unconstitutional.51 Unfortunately, taking the Chee Siok Chin approach to 
constitutional interpretation, whether in Singapore or Vietnam, leaves the door open 
for arbitrary laws to be enacted. 
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
While the manner of applying a proportionality analysis in rights adjudication differs 
among jurisdictions, four steps are typically involved: (1) a determination that the 
government has legal authority to enact the restrictive measure in question: (2) a 
suitability test that establishes whether the means adopted in the measure and the 
policy objectives of the measure are linked by a rational relationship; (3) a necessity 
 
45  [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525, CA. 
46  Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed. 
47  Chng Suan Tze, above, n 45 at 551–552, [79] and [82], applied in Law Society of Singapore v Tan 
Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at 313, [149], HC, and Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General 
[2011] 2 SLR 1189 at 1233–1234, [78]–[80], CA. 
48  Chng Suan Tze, ibid. 
49  Id at 553, [86]. 
50  [2010] 3 SLR 489, CA (Singapore). 
51  Id at 500, [16]. 
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test that requires the measure to restrict rights as minimally as is reasonably possible 
in the circumstances; and (4) a balancing exercise in which the benefits of the 
restrictive measure are compared against the costs arising from the curtailment of 
rights. 
What I have attempted to do in this brief paper is to justify why a 
proportionality analysis should be used when determining whether the lawmaking 
branch of government has a legitimate interest in restricting a particular 
fundamental liberty through legislation. It is submitted that doing so would give full 
and substantial meaning to the concept of rights, and would prevent the enactment 
of arbitrary legislation. 
Admittedly, the provisions in the Singapore Constitution permitting 
Parliament to impose limitations on fundamental liberties lack terms such as 
“reasonable restrictions” and “restrictions necessary in a democratic society”, thus 
lending themselves to the idea that the courts must find to be constitutional whatever 
legislation falling within the enumerated grounds for limitation that Parliament 
chooses to enact, regardless of how disproportionate or unreasonable it is. The 
position under the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam may be similar. It is submitted that 
such an approach is undesirable. To avoid this result, one possible reform that may 
be considered when the Vietnamese Constitution is reviewed is to permit laws 
restricting basic rights and freedoms only if the restrictions are reasonable and 
necessary in a democratic society, which is the position in Canada and the United 
Kingdom. 
Alternatively, assuming a mechanism for constitutional review is adopted, the 
institution responsible for carrying out this function should consider implementing a 
proportionality analysis when interpreting the bill of rights. Ultimately, this 
institution is likely to do so only if it sees that it has a duty to maximize the 
fundamental liberties guaranteed to people, and to avoid literal, legalistic readings of 
the constitution. Under the proportionality approach, this institution will possess a 
fair degree of discretion in determining whether a restrictive measure should prevail 
against a right. This should be regarded as a strength and not a shortcoming of 
constitutional adjudication. The discretion will enable the institution to express 
independent, considered views on key issues of the day, engaging the executive and 
legislative branches of government in a constitutional dialogue. 
 
 
Lee: Proportionality in Interpreting Constitutions … 13 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AC … Appeal Cases (UK) 
Art, Arts … Article, Articles (of a 
constitution) 
 
c … chapter number (of a UK 
statute) 
CA … Court of Appeal 
Cap … chapter number (of a Singapore 
statute) 
Colum J Transnat’l L … Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 
 
ECHR … European Court of 
Human Rights 
ed, eds … editor, editors 
EHRR …  European Human Rights 
Reports 
ETS … European Treaty Series 
 
HC … High Court 
HL … House of Lords 
 
J … Justice (a judge) 
 
LQR … Law Quarterly Review 
 
n … note (footnote) 
 
para … paragraph 
PC … (Judicial Committee of the) Privy 
Council 
Pt … Part (of a statute) 
 
Rev Ed … Revised Edition (of a 
statute) 
 
s, ss … section, sections (of a 
statute) 
Sch … Schedule (of a statute) 
SC … Supreme Court 
SCR … Supreme Court Reports 
(Canada) 
SLR(R) …  Singapore Law Reports 
(Reissue) 
 
UNTS … United Nations Treaty 
Series 
US … United States Reports 
 
 
In the footnotes, a number in brackets (such as “[50]”) is a paragraph number. 
 
